

JAPAN GETTING READY FOR WAR.

A Conflict With Russia Over Corea
Predicted.

MAY COME IN NEAR FUTURE

Island Is Too Small for Her Population—Blow to Russia's Trade
With China.

San Francisco, Oct. 15.—A war between Russia and Japan over Corea is predicted by Dr. Nicholas Seen, professor of surgery in the University of Chicago, who has arrived here from a tour of the orient. Said he:

"While I was in Japan I noticed on every hand that the Japanese were making preparations for war with Russia and they made no secret of it. The cause of the trouble is no secret in Japan. It wants Corea. Japan is not large enough for the Japanese. Russia practically holds Manchuria and Japan does not intend letting this nation extend its influence to Corea. If this condition can be prevented, hence the preparation for war."

RUSSIA'S TRADE WITH CHINA.

New York, Oct. 15.—The correspondent of the Times at Odessa says recent returns in regard to the Russia's trade with China bear testimony to the severity of the blow dealt to Russia by the outbreak in China. In the first four months of this year the trade by the Khabarovsk route amounted to \$50,000,000 (437,750) as compared with the trade in the corresponding months of last year of \$30,000,000. In the light of these figures, remarks the correspondent, the attitude of the Russian journals toward the restoration of Manchuria to the Chinese is intelligible.

ADMIRAL SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY

The following testimony given before the Schley court of inquiry Monday was received too late for publication in our issue of yesterday:

AFTERNOON SESSION.

At the afternoon session of the court Capt. Cook continued his testimony in response to interrogatories by Mr. Hanna, who asked: "At the time the turn of the Brooklyn was made were you in such a position that you could observe whether or not the engines of the Texas were backed or reversed?"

"I think I ought to have seen it at the distance she was from us."

"Did you see any such?" "I did not."

"In reference to the conversation between you and Mr. Hanna, did you not hear the conversation between them?" "Not one word of it."

"Did you make any suggestions to you or have an conversation with you during the battle?" "Quite a number of times."

"Did he have that conversation, or the substance of it, with you?"

"The only thing I recollect, which I recollect clearly, is that this summer when I met him at Newport he asked if I recalled it, and I recalled that at the time we were turning after we had been turning some time, and after the helm was put hard a port, he came across to me and said: 'Captain, do you see the Texas?' She was the nearest ship at the time. I was looking directly at her, and just about then we were pretty well clear of her. I said: 'Oh, yes, and he told me that entirely reassured him, and he walked away.'"

"Did you use any expression or language which could have been understood by him as meaning, 'damn the Texas'?"

"No, I had every reason to bless her, no reason to damn her."

"How was the turn of the Brooklyn written in the log?"

"So far as I know with port helm. I never observed the course, which I suppose you are coming to until it was shown to me here in Washington, and I did not understand it then. I could not recall anything in connection with it. It was the turn of the Brooklyn during the battle, when it was written, to be read by the officers and signed by them, afterward by the navigator, when it was submitted to me. I sometimes had time to look at it and sometimes did not. I do not believe I looked at it within three or four days after the battle. I may have looked at it, but the first real recollection I have of it was when my attention was called to the fact that the navigator wanted to make it more full and complete. I said: 'Write it up as you recollect it and submit it to me, but no changes are to be made under any circumstances in the log as it stands now. It can be added to but not any changes in the original log.' So he wrote this, and I signed it. I have since read it and do not know which is the best account."

"You refer now to the addendum?"

"Yes. At that time there was no question about the way the ship turned. I suppose I should have noted it had it been done, but I probably did not see it until after that change was made. I certainly would have seen it before."

"Do you recall a visit of Mr. Sharp to the Brooklyn and an interview, at which the commodore and yourself were present, about the direction in which the Brooklyn turned on that morning?"

"No, I may state I was not present at any such interview."

LETTER HANDED WITNESS.

"If the court please, I should like to hand to the witness a letter, apparently signed by himself and dated September 28, 1898, the letter which was referred to by Admiral Evans when he was giving his testimony, and which he desired to read at that time. An objection was made then, counsel suggesting that the proper course would be when Capt. Cook went on the stand." Capt. Cook was handed the letter by Mr. Hanna to identify.

Admiral Dewey—Has the letter anything to do with any of these specifications?"

Judge-advocate—Not specifically. Admiral Dewey—Then it had better not be read."

COOK WANTED IT READ.

Capt. Cook—Mr. President, I would like to have it read for this reason: It has been referred to, and seems to convey the idea that there was an issue between Capt. Evans and myself. I think as it is on the record that such

a letter has passed, there should not be any doubt about the matter.

Admiral Dewey—I do not think it has anything to do with the case.

Capt. Cook—It is my letter and my signature.

Admiral Dewey—Admiral Evans is not on trial; Capt. Cook is not on trial. Capt. Cook said there was no issue between himself and Admiral Evans. The letter was not read.

The court asked a number of questions of Capt. Cook, which, with the answers, were as follows:

"How did you become aware of the orders under which the flying squadron sailed May 19 to Cienfuegos?"

"Conversation with Commodore Schley."

"What general orders were issued by Commodore Schley regarding the blockade of Cienfuegos?"

"I cannot recall that there were any written orders. I think it was of course, I understood being in command of his flagship understood in consultation with the captains in a general way."

"Was any effort made by boats of the flying squadron and a landing place near Cienfuegos prior to the arrival of the Marlborough?"

"None that I know of."

"Did any conversation take place between you and Commodore Schley in regard to the obtaining of information from Capt. McCalla when the Marlborough passed the Brooklyn while the last named vessel was en route to Cienfuegos?"

"No that I can recall."

"What reasons did Commodore Schley give you for his belief that Cervera's squadron was in Cienfuegos?"

SCHLEY WAS ENTHUSIASTIC.

"In the first place, upon leaving Key West he was quite enthusiastic; at having been given the command of the south side of Cuba, and he said he expected to catch that fleet; that both he and Commander-in-Chief Sampson believed Cienfuegos was the objective point. I think I have already stated that he believed he would find them there. On Saturday night he heard, from some officers who reported to him, what sounded like salutes in the afternoon. I never have known what that was. Certainly, something of the kind occurred, and he said it sounded as if they were having some kind of jubilee."

"When we arrived at Cienfuegos, there were the signal lights that misled us all. We thought they had some-thing to do with the Spanish squadron either coming or being there. We again, the arrival of the Adula with her strange action, I believed at that time they were there, and I thought this was a ruse to get some communication to them. That is all I can recollect."

"Did the Brooklyn have a fleet night order book?"

"I am not able to answer that question. On the Brooklyn I received my instructions of course, direct from the flag officer. I had my own night order book, and what orders I received I put in that."

"Did you examine the sailing directions or information regarding the possibility of coaling ships near Cape Cruz?"

"Yes."

ORDERS FROM SCHLEY.

"What orders were given by Commodore Schley to the ships of the flying squadron for their guidance in the event of Cervera's squadron being sighted at sea, and in the event of its coming into the harbor of Santiago?"

"I know of no written order that would cover the case; but in consultation with the commanding officers it was understood that at night time we would be in column and ready. During the day time we had our assigned positions. That he should attack wherever he found them, and I presume he governed by circumstances."

"Had any vessel taken coal at Cienfuegos prior to the time when Commodore Schley discussed the coal supply with Commander McCalla?"

"I do not know. I think not."

"At what distance from the entrance of Cienfuegos did the large ships lie while blockading, both by day and night?"

"From four to six miles. I should judge, closer at night."

"Did you observe that there is an anchorage at Cape Cruz where large ships would be protected from easterly and southeasterly winds while coaling?"

"My impression is it does not. That was my observation at the time."

"Do you know why the squadron was headed for a point twenty or thirty miles from the entrance to Santiago instead of near the shore?"

"Because, as I understood at the time, if the weather conditions were such that we could not coal off Santiago, we should continue to Gonaves bay, but upon arrival at Santiago, if the conditions were such that we could coal from the collier, we would go up off the entrance."

COURSE OF SQUADRON.

"Were you ordered by Commodore Schley to shape the course of the squadron for a point off Santiago May 24?"

"Yes."

"What was the direction of the prevailing wind from May 22 to June 1?"

"It was southeast and southwest. I think. I think the wind on the 25th was northeast. It is all a matter of log. The fresh winds were from the northeast. The other winds from the southeast to southwest."

"Did you observe the squadron using full power during the fight of July 3?"

"No. We did not have full power."

Sewing as a business is an exacting and exhausting occupation. Long hours, fine work, poor light, unhealthy atmosphere—these are only some of the things which fret the nerves and hurt the general health. Often there is a diseased condition of the womanly organism which causes backache or headache and the working of the sewing machine under such conditions is akin to torture.

Thousands of women who work have written grateful letters to Dr. R. V. Pierce, whose "Favorite Prescription" has cured their womanly ills and established their general health. "Favorite Prescription" establishes regularity, dries up unhealthy and offensive discharges, heals inflammation and ulceration, and cures female weakness. It makes weak women strong and sick women well.

Sick women are invited to consult Dr. Pierce by letter, free, and so avoid the unkind and obnoxious local treatments deemed necessary by some physicians. All correspondence private. Address Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

"I take great pleasure in recommending Dr. Pierce's Favorite Prescription for female weakness," writes Dr. Susanah Pennington, of Pease Store, Shelby Co., Texas. "I was troubled with bearing-down pains in my back and hips for six years, and wrote to Dr. Pierce for advice. I tried his 'Favorite Prescription' and six bottles cured me. I feel like a new person and I thank Dr. Pierce for his life. Life is a burden to any one without health. I have told a great many of my friends about the great medicine I took."

Dr. Pierce's Common Sense Medical Adviser, in paper covers, is sent free on receipt of 21 one-cent stamps to pay expense of mailing only. Address Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

Dr. R. V. Pierce, Buffalo, N. Y.

DO YOU GET UP WITH A LAME BACK?

Kidney Trouble Makes You Miserable.

Almost everybody who reads the newspapers is sure to know of the wonderful cures made by Dr. Kilmer's Swamp-Root, the great kidney, liver and bladder remedy.

It is the great medical triumph of the nineteenth century; discovered after years of scientific research by Dr. Kilmer, the eminent kidney and bladder specialist, and is wonderfully successful in promptly curing all cases of kidney, bladder, uric acid troubles and Bright's disease, which is the worst form of kidney trouble.

Dr. Kilmer's Swamp-Root is not recommended for everything but if you have kidney, liver or bladder trouble it will be found just the remedy you need. It has been tested in so many ways, in hospital work, in private practice, among the helpless too poor to purchase relief and has proved so successful in every case that a special arrangement has been made by which all readers of this paper who have not already tried it may have a sample bottle sent free by mail, also a book telling more about Swamp-Root and how to find out if you have kidney or bladder trouble.

When writing mention reading this generous offer in this paper and send your address to Dr. Kilmer & Co., Binghamton, N. Y. The regular fifty cent and dollar sizes are sold by all good druggists.

until the end of the action, until just about when the Colon went ashore."

"Why not?"

"The order required us to keep steam for moving eight or nine knots, I think, with some of the engines uncoupled. We used the after-engines. In the early part of the action we had steam enough to make twelve knots, and we kept on increasing the steam until we had all the steam we could use with the two engines. We continued to get steam with the last of the Colon ashore, beyond the point we would lose time in coupling up the engines. It would have taken twenty-five minutes to couple up. We had all the steam we could use in the after-engines."

"What orders were given by Commodore Schley to the fleet by signal or otherwise during the battle of July 3?"

"Quite a number of signals were made, but I only recollect a few of them. The first signal made was the formulated signal to close in. Afterward there were signals made; a great many signals were made to the Oregon. There is a record, I believe, in the log book. I did not pay any attention to the signals during the action except such as affected me."

Admiral Dewey—The witnesses has spoken of the order requiring them to keep steam up for moving with some of the engines uncoupled. Was that order by Commander Schley?"

"It was the order of the commander-in-chief while lying on blockade."

"Did the Spanish ships head to the westward or southwest before the Brooklyn made the turn with port helm?"

"They did not."

"Was the helm of the Brooklyn steered or eased at any time during the turn, after the order 'hard a port'?"

"No, not until she was around and parallel with the Spanish fleet."

"What ships would have had their fire blanketed had the Brooklyn turned with starboard helm?"

ONLY ONE THING CONSIDERED.

"It is possible it might have blanketed the fire of the Texas; it is possible it might have interfered with the movements of the Spanish fleet in the space in which we turned. I will say that I never considered for one moment any other thing but turning that ship to starboard."

"How far were the vessels of the flying squadron off the entrance of the port of Santiago while on blockade first by day and second by night?"

"The blockade was closer and closer all the time. The first night I should say that it was between five and six miles off, and about seven miles off at day. They steamed in a circle from five to six miles from the entrance and from four to five miles each side, so as to cover the entrance."

COMMANDER FULHAM CALLED.

Lieut. Commander W. F. Fulham, who was in command of the Oregon during the Santiago campaign, was next called. He described the engagement with the Colon on May 31, and testified concerning the studimeter, saying that he found it was not reliable beyond 2,000 yards, and that it was necessary to verify measurements by it with the sextant. The witness also described the bombardment of the shore batteries on June 14, when, he said, the New Orleans went within 2,000 yards of the eastern battery. On that occasion both the eastern and western batteries were silenced.

BEALE'S STORY.

Commander Fulham was then excused and Joseph Beale was called. He said he had formerly been in the navy, but resigned in 1895, and came to the service as a volunteer during the war with Spain. He had served as an officer on the Harvard. He detailed the meeting of the Harvard with the flying squadron on May 27, when that vessel carried dispatches to the commodore from Mole St. Nicholas. There were five of these dispatches, which had come in cipher and which he had translated. One was from Admiral Sampson and the other four from Schley. This last one from the secretary was received at the Mole at 8:30 a. m., May 26, and was the dispatch directing the commander of the Harvard to proceed at once to inform Schley that the department's information is that the Spaniards are at Santiago. He read this dispatch and also one from Admiral Sampson saying that the Spaniards were at Santiago. Both these dispatches were, he said, delivered to the commanding officer of the Harvard by him.

Mr. Beale also detailed the particulars of his proof to go ashore and secure information concerning the situation. "I saw," he said, "that I had the first information from the department and thought it was my chance, and by making early application I thought I should get the opportunity." He brought his desire to the attention of Capt. Cotton and had, he thought, done so, before the arrival at Santiago on May 27.

EXPLAINS CHANGE IN MESSAGE.

Mr. Beale also said he had translated into cipher Commodore Schley's response to the dispatch of May 26. He explained the verbal changes in this message, saying: "In the first place, in regard to the difference in putting the message in cipher it often occurs that a certain word cannot be found in the code book. In that case it was my practice to get an equivalent word if I could possibly do so, and avoid the labor of spelling out a word letter by letter. For example: 'bad, boisterous weather.' If I could not find the word 'boisterous' I would use 'bad,' so that it would appear bad weather. In the same way it is sometimes possible to send a number of words as a phrase or to find in the code book an equivalent phrase very nearly the same meaning and the same meaning. In that case I would use the phrase."

"As regards the difference in the amount of coal ordered to be at Key

West, I have very clear recollection of that. The number '10,000' was much easier and simpler to send than '3,500,' and so I sent it as '10,000,' believing that an excess of 500 tons would do no harm. In the same way, if twenty-five tons appeared in the translation of my cipher, in place of twenty-seven, I would explain it in the same way."

ANOTHER DIFFERENCE SHOWN.

"I believe also there is a difference about the Harvard being ordered in the original to Port Royal instead of Kingston, Jamaica. Explaining this I would say that Port Royal is the naval station a mile or two below Kingston, and in all probability the code book contained only the name of Kingston and the United Port Royal."

"Now, as regards the added sentence. I have a copy of that message in my daily journal. That copy does not contain the added sentence. I find further along in the journal a note referring to this message, which read: 'Add very difficult to tow collier. Cannot get cables to hold.' From that I infer that after the typewritten sheet was prepared an addition to this message was given to me."

HAD COPY ONLY.

Judge-advocate—What, as shown by the intercept of the message, was the tenor of this message with regard to the obedience or disobedience or difficulty in obeying the orders of the department?"

"I have here only the copy of the message given me to translate in cipher. I have not a copy of the translation at the Washington end. My copy reads: 'It is to be regretted that the department's orders cannot be obeyed. Earnestly we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West.'"

PILOT NUNEZ.

Mr. Beale was the last of the government witnesses, and at 3:30 Edwardo Nunez, the Cuban pilot, was called as the last witness. Admiral Schley's witnesses.

An interpreter was introduced as Nunez cannot speak English. He said he had been a pilot for twenty-one years in all the southern Cuban ports. The interpreter used the word 'guide' in interpreting his statement as above, and Admiral Dewey corrected him saying the word should be 'pilot.'

Nunez said he first met Commodore Schley on May 25, having been taken to him by the St. Paul. The commodore, he said, asked him if he knew of the presence of the Spanish fleet at Santiago. He replied that he did not know, but that he did not think the water was deep enough for vessels of such size.

On June 1 he had gone on the Vixen to the Cuban coast, with a message to the Calixto Garcia, which he had delivered to Col. Cebereco. Commodore Schley had sent him on this mission, and he had been told then by Cebereco that the Spanish fleet was in the harbor. This information Nunez said he had carried to Admiral Sampson, under the direction of Commodore Schley.

Capt. Parker then read a copy of the letter from the pilot said he had carried from Commodore Schley to the Cubans, in which he suggested a code of signals similar to the code arranged by Capt. McCalla at Cienfuegos.

On cross-examination the witness said that Cebereco had given him the names of the Spanish vessels inside the harbor. He gave the names of those vessels, saying that they were given to him at that time by Cebereco.

The witness also said that prior to going ashore June 1 he had not seen the Colon. He had not seen that vessel, indeed, until June 2.

"How far were the vessels of the flying squadron off the entrance of the port of Santiago while on blockade first by day and second by night?"

"The blockade was closer and closer all the time. The first night I should say that it was between five and six miles off, and about seven miles off at day. They steamed in a circle from five to six miles from the entrance and from four to five miles each side, so as to cover the entrance."

COMMANDER FULHAM CALLED.

Lieut. Commander W. F. Fulham, who was in command of the Oregon during the Santiago campaign, was next called. He described the engagement with the Colon on May 31, and testified concerning the studimeter, saying that he found it was not reliable beyond 2,000 yards, and that it was necessary to verify measurements by it with the sextant. The witness also described the bombardment of the shore batteries on June 14, when, he said, the New Orleans went within 2,000 yards of the eastern battery. On that occasion both the eastern and western batteries were silenced.

BEALE'S STORY.

Commander Fulham was then excused and Joseph Beale was called. He said he had formerly been in the navy, but resigned in 1895, and came to the service as a volunteer during the war with Spain. He had served as an officer on the Harvard. He detailed the meeting of the Harvard with the flying squadron on May 27, when that vessel carried dispatches to the commodore from Mole St. Nicholas. There were five of these dispatches, which had come in cipher and which he had translated. One was from Admiral Sampson and the other four from Schley. This last one from the secretary was received at the Mole at 8:30 a. m., May 26, and was the dispatch directing the commander of the Harvard to proceed at once to inform Schley that the department's information is that the Spaniards are at Santiago. He read this dispatch and also one from Admiral Sampson saying that the Spaniards were at Santiago. Both these dispatches were, he said, delivered to the commanding officer of the Harvard by him.

Mr. Beale also detailed the particulars of his proof to go ashore and secure information concerning the situation. "I saw," he said, "that I had the first information from the department and thought it was my chance, and by making early application I thought I should get the opportunity." He brought his desire to the attention of Capt. Cotton and had, he thought, done so, before the arrival at Santiago on May 27.

EXPLAINS CHANGE IN MESSAGE.

Mr. Beale also said he had translated into cipher Commodore Schley's response to the dispatch of May 26. He explained the verbal changes in this message, saying: "In the first place, in regard to the difference in putting the message in cipher it often occurs that a certain word cannot be found in the code book. In that case it was my practice to get an equivalent word if I could possibly do so, and avoid the labor of spelling out a word letter by letter. For example: 'bad, boisterous weather.' If I could not find the word 'boisterous' I would use 'bad,' so that it would appear bad weather. In the same way it is sometimes possible to send a number of words as a phrase or to find in the code book an equivalent phrase very nearly the same meaning and the same meaning. In that case I would use the phrase."

"As regards the difference in the amount of coal ordered to be at Key

Run Down

weak, nervous, exhausted, all out of sorts. Overworked nerves are always irritable and restless. The eyelids twitch, the stomach rebels, the brain is fogged, and the heart is unsteady. Stop the waste of nerve-force. Stimulate digestion, strengthen the nerves, and replenish the vital power.

"Failing strength had reduced my vitality; grip brought on bronchitis and nervous prostration, and I suffered from dizzy spells, nervousness, confusion of the mind and palpitation of the heart. Dr. Miles' Nervine and Pills worked a complete cure."

Mrs. J. E. HARVELL, East Atlanta, Ga.

Stricken With Paralysis.

Henderson Grimes, of this place, was stricken with partial paralysis and completely lost the use of one arm and side. After being treated by an eminent physician for quite a while without relief, his wife recommended Chamberlain's Pain Balm, and after using two bottles of it he is almost entirely cured.—Geo. R. McDonald, Man, Logan county, W. Va. Several other very remarkable cures of partial paralysis have been effected by the use of this liniment. It is most widely known, however, as a cure for rheumatism, sprains and bruises. For sale by all druggists.

Dr. Miles' Nervine

is a perfect restorative for the weak, the tired, the feeble and the run-down.

Sold by druggists on guarantee. Dr. Miles Medical Co., Elkhart Ind.

It was also proved that it had been received for in good order at the sub-treasury, and that the seals were unbroken. After the expert examination the secret service men are inclined to think the package was tampered with after it reached the sub-treasury and had been received for.

Three Crowned Heads to Meet.

New York, Oct. 15.—The Rome correspondent of the Times says that King Victor Emmanuel will not meet the czar at St. Petersburg, but at some other city, where Emperor Francis Joseph will also be present.

It is believed that the chief object of the meeting is to examine the situation, in the Balkans with a view to antagonizing growing between Italy and Austria-Hungary and the anxiety of Russia to avoid complications.

The date for the meeting has not yet been determined. The king will be accompanied by the premier and foreign minister.

THE PANAMA CANAL.

Columbia Signifies Its Readiness to Transfer to United States.

New York, Oct. 15.—A dispatch from Paris to the Times says that the directors of the new Panama company in a circular to the shareholders say that Colombia has expressed its readiness to sanction the transfer of the canal to the United States. An estimate of the value of the undertaking is therefore being prepared, at the request of the isthmian canal commission. It will be ready by the time Congress meets.

Poor People Going to Capetown.

New York, Oct. 15.—The Capetown correspondent